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AN EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK OF
LEGAL AID MODELS
ARTHUR L. BERNEY*
AND
HARRY A. PIERCE**
The purpose of this Article is to place the systems for legal service
to the poor in the developed countries of the world within an evaluative
perspective that may be useful to planners of such systems in develop-
ing countries. Part I presents one exposition of the process of national
development, with particular emphasis on the role of law and lawyers.
Part II describes the major legal service systems used in the West. In
Part III, some observations are offered about the relationship between
a country's development goals and its choice of a legal service program
or system.
I. LAW, LAWYERS, AND LEGAL SERVICES IN A
DEVELOPMENTAL CONTEXT
A. A Theory of Political Development
Some generalities can be cautiously offered about the process of de-
velopment of the modem state. Professor Organski, in a widely ac-
cepted approach, defines three stages of political development through
which all nations must pass: (1) primitive unification; (2) industrial-
ization; and (3) national welfare.' Primitive unification, briefly, is the
coalescense of various traditional forces into a common authoritative
framework (the nation-state). The impetuses behind this develop-
ment are diverse. For instance, unification has sometimes occurred
under colonial subjugation, and at other times, in the wake of an anti-
colonial reaction. Law, particularly in its constitutive and institutive
functions, plays a major role in establishing the unitary authority; but
* Professor of Law, Boston College. LL.B., 1958, University of Virginia.
** Member of the Massachusetts and New York Bars. B.A., 1970, Syracuse Uni-
versity; J.D., 1973, Boston College.
1. A. ORGANSKI, THE STAGES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1965). For applica-
tions of this theory to legal systems, see Auerbach, Legal Development in Developing
Countries: The American Experience, 63 PRoc. AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. 81 (1969); Mendel-
son, Law and the Development of Nations, 32 J. POL. 223 (1970).
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the legal profession, as we think of it, does not have much part in the
transformations taking place at this stage.'
In the unification stage, allegiance to the emerging state is the prime
demand on the population. Any dislocations that occur are ordinarily
a consequence of the destruction of former allegiances.
The industrialization stage, in contrast, is characterized chiefly by
the heavy demands made upon all segments of the population as a part
of the pursuit of rapid economic growth and modernization. Social and
economic exploitation, repression, and dislocation are common during
this stage as three interrelated processes take place: the accumulation
of capital, rural-urban migration, and the accession to power of modern-
izing elites. During this period of great internal disruption and change,
government tolerates, and sometimes even encourages, the establish-'
ment of competitive power centers. In the context of this intranational
contest for power, the need for the skills of representation, advocacy,
and negotiation are sorely felt. This stage sees the rise of the legal
profession as it is known in the West. Many of the characteristics and
attributes of the profession may be traced to the fact of its ascendency
during this period.
The national welfare stage sees a role reversal by the state, The
tensions generated by the industrialization stage are recognized to be
inconsistent with the fundamental integrative thrust of the stage of
primitive unification. For reasons that need not be explored here,
ranging from rumblings of revolutionary discontent to the social con-
science of older ruling classes, the state in the national welfare stage
turns to implementing the idea of "commonwealth." The emergence
of the social-welfare state is the predominant manifestation of this
stage. Law, as the means by which economic growth is stablized and
wealth redistributed, will perform an important function during this
period. Exactly what role the legal profession will play in this stage
is problematic.
B. The Role of the Legal Profession
In an essay on the adaptability of the legal institutions of industrial-
ized countries to the needs of developing countries, Professor Franck
2. In fact, except in an independence movement, which in theoretical terms is a
spurious unification form, the profession as such rarely exists at this stage of develop-
ment. iL
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asserts that three types of law, lawyers, and legal institutions arose in
the United States in response to each of Organski's three stages and
that the legal culture of developing nations pursuing all three goals con-
currently must furnish lawyers of all three types.3 The bar must include
those adept at achieving national unification and integration, those ex-
pert at promoting industrial and commercial growth, and those function-
ing to foster social justice, human welfare, and the equitable distribution
of rights and privileges, duties and burdens.4
Conflict avoidance and reconciliation among the three will be a necessity,
according to Franck, requiring a "predictive foresight, a shrewd aware-
ness of potential trade-offs, and an ability to devise new incentives for
compromise."'  For this, there will be needed lawyers who specialize
in "maximizing the participation of affected publics in the making and
eventual execution of developmental decisions"6 and who possess the
skills of social planners.
Denied by the communications revolution the opportunity to develop
"naturally" or gradually, a developing country faces the awesome task
of meeting the demands of all three stages of political development at
once. It is no wonder then that the legal profession, insofar as it can
contribute to this undertaking, might be expected to perform a more
demanding role than it played in the past. That little in its past has
prepared the legal profession for its new role has not discouraged hope-
ful members from sounding the call. Urging that the lawyer in the de'
veloping countries assume an ever-increasing role as a planner, the late
Professor Wolfgang Friedmann wrote:
If the lawyer continues to be identified . . . with the defense of the ex-
isting order and of vested interests, against the urgent needs and inter-
ests of societies that must lift themselves from poverty and stagnation
to a radically higher level of economic and social development, often
within a desperately short time, the lawyer will eventually be reduced
to an inferior and despised status in the developing nations. [He] must
become an active and responsible participant in the shaping and formu-
lation of development plans. He must guide and counsel but also warn
where necessary. He must acknowledge the drastically increased role of
public law in developing societies, which usually have inadequate re-
3. Franck, The New Development: Can American Law and Legal Institutions
Help Developing Countries?, 1972 WIs. L. Rvy. 767, 776-81.
4. Id. at 777.
5. Id. at 778.
6. Id.
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sources, a totally inadequate quality and quantity of responsible private
venture capital, gross educational deficiencies, and a minimum of tech-
nical skills and administrative experience.1
The demands upon the lawyer may go beyond freeing himself from
alignment with vested interests; they might call for the apparent viola-
tion of norms to which he is deeply committed, such as equal treatment.
As an example, Friedmann noted that, although the break-up of large,
private landholdings may be desired by social planners, treatment of
these interests must be differentiated from treatment of small peasant
landholders. In the service of social policy, Friedmann suggested, the
lawyer must compromise his tendency to protect equally the vested in-
terests of both large and small landholders.
Although little in the record of the profession in developed nations
suggests that the challenge of a new role will be met, sufficient signs
of change justify a brief examination of the behavior of the profession,
or, more precisely, the variation in behavior, with regard to legal assist-
ance of the poor.
C. Legal Incompetence of the Poor-A Professional Failing
In the industrialization stage, the working and consumer class makes
up the great exploited mass in the drive toward national economic
growth. Beneath this class, in terms of powerlessness, are the unem-
ployed indigent. With no perceived power, this class neither attracts
nor seeks the services of the legal profession. In the phrase of Carlin,
Howard, and Messinger, they suffer from "legal incompetence'-an in-
ability to further and protect their interests through active assertion of
legal rights.8 The authors describe several conditions in the law and
the profession that contribute to the inadequacy of representation of
the legally incompetent: (1) the "structure of rewards" in the legal
profession; (2) "party initiative" requirements; and (3) "legal rele-
vance."9
In their discussion of "structure of rewards," Carlin, Howard, and
Messinger mean more than that success, for the private bar, is meas-
7. Friedmann, The Role of Law and the Function of the Lawyer in Developing
Countries, 17 VAND. L. REv. 181, 186 (1963).
8. Carlin, Howard & Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor: Issues for Sociological
Research, 1 LAw & Soc'y Rav. 9, 69-71 (1967).
9. Id. at 63-67. A fourth condition, "focus on the particular case or controversy,"
was also described by the authors. Id. at 64.
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ured in terms of financial compensation. Prestige, challenge, and con-
tinuity in work all operate to favor representation of the wealthy. Atti-
tudes toward the practice of law for the poor, and many features of that
practice, are strong disincentives to representation of the poor. Factors
mentioned by the authors include: members of the profession, drawn
substantially from middle class backgrounds, relate badly to lower class
clientele; lack of resources causes lawyers to treat poor people's prob-
lems as "cut and dried", and thus the practice is considered to be ted-
ious; the levels of administration that typically handle poor people's
problems are least likely to appreciate vigorous representation and most
likely to invite the compromise of ethical standards. Under such a
"structure of rewards" it is no wonder that lawyers strive to move be-
yond the practice of the poor; those who do not do so are more likely
to be incompetent, unethical, or resentful.'"
The "party initiative requirement" is especially suited to maintaining
the level of "legal incompetence" of the poor. This requirement is of-
ten enshrined in the law or professional codes of conduct through pro-
hibitions against the solicitation of clients or the incitement of litigation.
This requirement tends to minimize the use of legal services by the
poor, and it contributes to the inadequacy of the representation re-
ceived. Because the poor typically seek legal advice only when their
legal problems are in extremis, the most effective form of representa-
tion, preventative service, is precluded.
Again as a result of unfamiliarity and distance, lawyers do not ap-
preciate the "legal relevance" of poor clients' difficulties. There is a
tendency among lawyers to define the problems of the poor as social
or psychological rather than legal and to conclude, therefore, that ther-
apy rather than justice is required. "The adoption of this perspective
weakens the lawyer's capacity to recognize legal rights and seek legal
remedies; it also provides him with a seemingly legitimate rationale for
perfunctory service and for his reluctance to serve the poor as a
lawyer.""'
The fact that until now the profession's record of response to the le-
gal needs of the poor has been uniformly insufficient, so much so that
commentators could assert that economic poverty was nearly always
synonymous with "legal incompetence," cannot be understood in terms
of blame or fault. As previously intimated, the explanation arguably
10. Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
381, 384-86 (1965).
11. Carlin, Howard & Messinger, supra note 8, at 67.
Vol. 1975:5]
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lies in the circumstance that the shift from the industrialization stage
to the national welfare stage is nowhere more than a recent and tenta-
tive phenomenon. Moreover, in no nation is there a legal profession
wholly formed and conditioned by national welfare stage norms. To
the contrary, every existing organized national bar has been conditioned
by (and in many respects epitomizes) the ethic of the industrialization
stage. Professionalism, as understood by the practicing bar, reflects all
the "virtues" of the ethic of individualism that has served industrial and
economic growth so admirably.
The performance of the profession, and of governments in general,
in the legal resolution of the difficulties of the poor must be seen
as a reflection of the prevailing moral, political, and economic
philosophies of the period in which the present bar developed.
Tracing that thesis through the history of legal services to the poor back
to ancient Rome, Dr. Cappelletti has identified three strains of impulse
to service.12 There is the "charitable" motivation, with its roots in the
medieval period when European nations were going through the uni-
fication stage. The idea of charity was consistent with the concept of
mercy, bestowed as an act of grace, by an all powerful but benevolent
sovereign. It was not until the grave pressures of industrial revolution
were imminent that the second impulse, the "political right" motivation,
emerged. This is most familiar to us in the concepts of natural justice
and equality articulated in the era of the French and American revolu-
tions. According to this view, legal standards defining the limitations
on the power of the state vested corresponding rights in the individual.
While grand admonitions of equal justice and rights were readily articu-
lated in the context of political conflict, the real impact of the concept
occurred in the economic field. Under the banner of freedom of con-
tract great advances in economic growth were achieved. Legal aid, un-
der the banner of equal justice, made small gains beyond that which
was "due" under charity. The central ethic of the legal profession as
we know it, the lawyer-advocate as the voice of the individual client's
will, developed in this context.
The last impulse, perhaps only now in the process of forming, might
be called the "social welfare" motivation. It calls for affirmative action
by the state
12. Cappelletti & Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and Variations, 24 STANer. L.
REv. 347, 348-64 (1972).
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to attack and ameliorate . . . [undesirable] social . . . conditions [by
means of] the rational allocation of limited resources . . . . By at-
tacking broad social conditions . . . it promotes effective economic
and social equality. 13
D. The Lawyer's Response-Two Archetypes
As noted previously, lawyers in industrialized countries generally re-
spond to the need for legal assistance to the poor according to indus-
trialization-stage norms. Recent years, however, have witnessed a
noteworthy development of the national welfare perspective, particu-
larly in the United States. 14 Since it is argued here that the source and
nature of the lawyer's response may fundamentally influence the choice
of the legal service model implemented, it may be worth examining,
briefly, how the two perspectives are manifested in practice. General-izing from the experience of United States, it is possible to present a
bipolar description of the practicing legal assistance lawyer.' 5 At the
two poles stand the "traditionalist" (lawyer as professional technician)
and the "reformist" (lawyer as social engineer and planner).
The traditionalist, who epitomizes the industrialization-stage ethic,
might be defined most succinctly as the agent of economic man. He
is, in Western society, the embodiment of the utilitarian principle-
maximizing benefits and minimizing costs for his client. This calculus
is the very code of his profession. Assisting the poor, for him, simply
entails the parallel extension of services enjoyed by the paying client.
Ideally he serves his client as a dedicated professional with equal vigor
regardless of the client's cause or station; "neither homage to the rich,
nor empathy for the poor" might be his motto.
The traditionalist belief that justice is born of conflict between
equally equipped champions (lawyers) rests upon assumptions about
the law' s and about the availability of lawyers that, to say the least, are
13. Id. at 407. This motivation could also be called "political" were it not for the
confusion in terminology that might result.
14. The declaration of the "War on Poverty" by President Johnson and the estab-
lishnent of a nationally-funded legal service program of grand design and dimension
prompts the statement in the text. Since different premises obtain in socialist states,
the comparative statement is not intended to extend to them. See generally Calm &
Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-The Public in Public Interest Law, 79
YALE L.. 1005, 1006-07 (1970).
15. The description is intended purely as a depictive device because reality is almost
invariably a matter of continua and tendencies.
16. These assumptions encompass the interrelated beliefs that the allocation of
Vol. 1975:5]
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questionable. A hallmark of traditional positions, in any context, is an
unwillingness to re-examine underlying assumptions. Often the idea
of questioning does not even occur. One explanation for this character-
istic is that traditions are protected against premise challenges by insti-
tutions. For example, one of the tenets of the traditionalist-scrupu-
lous adherence to the professional code of ethics (an institutional com-
mand)-actually operates as a means of obviating the need to question
the validity of the assumption about the availability of lawyers. As
noted earlier, ethical rules promulgated by bar associations to regulate
intraprofessional behavior prohibit such things as advertising, solicita-
tion, and stirring up litigation. The main purposes of these rules are said
to be the preservation of existing patterns of competition in the bar,
protection of the public from misrepresentation, prevention of "com-
mercialization of the practice of law," and protection of the image of
the profession in order to sustain public confidence in it.17 Whatever
else can be said about these justifications, clearly the rules minimize
the chances of contact between lawyers and the class of potential poor
clients.' 8 Thus, the need to confront the assumption of availability is
largely averted.
Another assumption of the traditionalist, which bears study because
it will especially affect the manner in which he practices law for the
poor, is that the law will produce just and fair results for all participants
so long as it is functioning properly. Accordingly, the lawyer's main
job is to assure proper functioning. Conversely, policy-making is not
a lawyer's job. Therefore, the traditionalist will pointedly ignore his
personal beliefs and political views in the representation of his clients.
This antipathy for the policy-making role has certain virtues as far as
rights and duties in the legal system is fair and self-correcting, that the legal problems
and claims of the poor and nonpoor are substantially similar, and most doubtful, that
law is causally isolable from other cultural and social factors. These beliefs are not
compatible with the view that the legal system contains "favored party" status for certain
groups, in terms of both substantive law and procedural rules. In an unpublished paper,
Professor Galanter of Buffalo University School of Law, has attempted to demonstrate
the institutional bias against the poor built into the United States legal system. M. Gal-
anter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
1973 (unpublished paper on file at State University of New York at Buffalo School of
Law). For examples of "favored parties," see Carlin, Howard & Messinger, supra note
8, at 12-17.
17. B. CmuSnmNSEN, LAwYm Rs FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 150-59 (1970).
18. Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARV. Civ.
RiGHTs-Cr. LIB. L. REv. 301 (1970); Note, Ethical Problems Raised by the Neighbor-
hood Law Offices, 41 NoTRE DAME Law. 961 (1966); Note, Advertising, Solicitation
and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J 1181 (1972).
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a poor client is concerned. The traditionalist is less likely to be pater-
nalistic and less likely to manipulate the client and usurp his decision-
making prerogatives. 19
This attitude toward the lawyer's role, nevertheless, has serious disad-
vantages for clients who are dependent and nonassertive, common traits
of the "legally incompetent." If, in addition, the lawyer's services are
motivated by feelings of charity, or even worse, are reluctantly tendered
as a professional or governmental obligation, that service will tend to
be passive to a fault. A poor client of such an attorney may expect
little more than assurance of procedural correctness through the repre-
sentation of the "passive" traditionalist.
The "active" traditionalist, acting perhaps from the "political rights"
motivation, may press legalistic arguments for substantive and proce-
dural changes in the law, but he too will tend to restrict his advocacy
and representation to traditional modes and forums. His basic in-
stinct and emphasis will be toward achieving the application and im-
plementation of existing laws and precedents. In a sense, this lawyer's
activity will be directed toward the expansion of legal rights on the hori-
zontal plane.
The reformist is more difficult to describe, if for no other reason than
that he is a relative newcomer to the legal profession. In his less radi-
cal guise he pursues solutions to the problems of the poor by a policy-
making and planning process designed to alter or replace existing legal
institutions and procedures. He tends to think of his clients as an in-
terest group and prefers to devise long-range strategies to serve the col-
lective interest rather than represent the individual client in the manner
that best meets the client's immediate needs.20
The nonradical reformist shares the faith of the traditionalist. He
has faith in the capacity of the existing order to correct itself and clings
to a belief that, with the right formula, the poor can be elevated to sub-
stantial parity through legal change and without a fundamental reorder-
ing of economic and political institutions.2'
19. Cahn & Cahn, supra note 14, at 1005-06.
20. A good example of this aspect of the reformist's practice can be found in the
experience of the legal arm of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People. Its school integration strategy spanned more than a decade; often in that period
the immediate advantage of a particular client had to be subsumed in the effort to attain
the group's long range goals. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
21. See Byrd & Gitchel, Two Lawyers Look at Legal Aid, 25 ARK. L. R v. 446
(1972); Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual
Vol. 1975:5]
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The radical reformist harbors grave doubts about the corrigibility and
reformatory power of the legal system. Since he does not believe that
the fundamental reordering of the economy and the polity,22 which he
perceives as necessary, can be accomplished through reform of the law,
the radical reformist has constant role identification difficulty. 28 As his
planning and policy-making views transcend the professionalism of the
advocacy models, so his view of legal change transcends the mere rede-
finition of substantive legal doctrines and procedures.24
Why in the face of such attitudes, do we persist in calling the radi-
cal reformist a lawyer? The reason is that, whatever else he asserts
Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 438 (1965); Miller, The Role
and Responsibility of the Legal Profession in a Changing Society, 33 TENN. L. Ray. 433
(1966); Viles, The War on Poverty: What Can Lawyers (Being Human) Do?, 53 IoWA
L. REv. 122 (1967). A good representation of this viewpoint is considered by many
to be that made by Professor Hazard in Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. CHI.
L Rnv. 699 (1969).
22. He is searching for the true middle ground between a free and a planned econ-
omy and between a centralized and decentralized polity. Note, The New Public Interest
Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1079-91 (1970).
23. See Kinoy, The Role of the Radical Lawyer and Teacher of Law: Some Re-
flections, 29 GumD Ppac. 3 (1970), in which, at the outset, Professor Kinoy says the
following:
mo my colleagues in struggle, and particularly to those who have newly come
to the battle, the questions are often more pressing. It is not a total contradic-
tion to be a radical teacher of law, a "radical" lawyer-a contradiction which
can only be resolved by exculpatory proclamations that "law is illegal" or
hortatory pronunciamentos that the only struggle is in the streets ....
To these earnest and deeply troubled lawyers I have but one reply. Yes,
the "radical" teacher of law, the "radical" lawyer, lives, functions, struggles,
in the midst of contradiction; his or her life is itself a contradiction.
Id. at 3.
24. The radical reformist might also be described as an unabashed, self-proclaimed
social engineer. For different reasons, some find little place for him within the profes-
sion. See Black, Some Notes on Law Schools in the Present Day, 79 YALE LJ. 505,
509-12 (1970). Professor Black writes:
Others of our students will be wanting to be prepared to go more directly
for the jugular of social injustice. As to them, we ought to help them sharpen
the knife, if they believe, with us, that the most thorough possible understand-
ing, the best possible training in thought, is the right whetstone. If, instead
of that, they want present action, there are plenty of other places where they
can find it. There is no reason to think either choice is mistaken.
Id. at 511. See also Note, supra note 22, at 1093-94:
Where the political lawyers represent groups, those groups tend to be "radi-
cal" in the sense that they are committed to fundamental change in the struc-
ture of American society .... Indeed, wary of any activity that confirms
or maintains "the system," some radical lawyers are hostile to the work done
by "public interest lawyers"; such work is counterproductive, in their view, for
while it can make the system slightly less oppressive, it defuses efforts for more
radical change.https://openscholars ip.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/8
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or does, he is grounded in a client-representative relationship that legit-
imates his conduct and confers his status. Moreover, the reformist
seeks attainment of his goals and, perhaps makes a creative contribu-
tion through the expansive exploration and redefinition of that relation-
ship. To use the law and the representative relationship as a vehicle
for change is not a new idea, but to use it as a socializing and politi-
cizing tool for change, rather than as a stablizing instrument, is a bold
idea. The first idea, change through law, is synonymous with incre-
mental, orderly change. The latter idea carries no such assurances.2"
By expanding the modalities of representation to include education,
organization, development, and politics, the radical reformist hopes to
set in motion forces that will lead to the fundamental reordering he de-
sires. First, education of the members of poor communities about their
rights and how, when, and where to assert them is seen by radical re-
formists as the appropriate answer to the "naturally selective" failure
of the law to penetrate those communities. The initial focus is upon
legal factors that tend to perpetuate the state of "legal incompetence,"
such as default judgments, prejudgment attachment, or the failure of
officials, including lawyers, to explain their actions.26 The primary
method of education is to draw the poor directly into the legal process.27
Secondly, organization is typically the basic device of the proponent
of political action. The radical reformist also has discovered its uses.
25. See Black, supra note 24. In discussing the civil rights movement in the legal
profession, Professor Black says:
The progression here is classic. The institution of law travailed. From the
school segregation cases forward, law by its only known means-judicial de-
cisions, statutes, administrative rulings--washed out of its fabric every trace of
racism--or as nearly as that is possible in human political action .... Things
have gotten tangibly and intangibly better for many blacks in ways which can
be traced to law as clearly as effect can be traced to cause in most social mat-
ters.
Id. at 506-07.
Still, some would add that, even out of this purely legal progression, unknown forces
have been loosed in American society. Few would be so bold as to claim that racism
has been eliminated here, or that its end will not require yet more travail or even tur-
moil.
26. See, e.g., Harrington, Preventive Law for Low Income Groups: The Texas
Southern Experience, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 339 (1969), See also Seidman, The Communica-
tion of Law and the Process of Development, 1972 Wis. L REV. 686.
27. Participation is a functional prerequisite to penetration and presumably would
increase the "effectiveness" of a legal system. See Friedman, Legal Culture and Social
Development, 4 LAw & Soc'y REv. 29, 43-44 (1969). See also Calm & Cahn, What
Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 No'Taa DAmE LAw. 927, 954
(1966).
Vol. 1975:5]
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He contends that just as economic interests made historic gains through
the organizational device of incorporation, so too will breakthroughs be
achieved in social advancement- through organization. Lawsuits and
common legal needs, if handled correctly, serve remarkably well as fo-
cal points for organization. Moreover, once organizations are
launched, the system's attempt to control the form and activities of the
organization will tend to maintain the lawyer in a critical, advisory posi-
tion. This in turn, presents otherwise unavailable opportunities for
achieving desired reformist goals. For example, in the litigation field,
he can more readily sustain class actions, or he can make credible
threats of economic reprisal, such- as boycotts or strikes. More con-
structively, organization provides wider educational opportunities and
the foundations for economic development activity. 8
Thirdly, development of social structure is a relatively new approach
in poverty advocacy, even as practiced by the radical reformist. Hous-
ing projects, food cooperatives, community development projects, and
neighborhood businesses require the assistance of the lawyer, paradoxi-
cally, in one of his most traditional guises, as business counselor. The
difference is that the radical reformist will be balancinb his rational
planning (for economic benefit maximization) with encouragement of
community participation (in the service of increasing legal competence
and penetration levels).
Lastly, political activity on behalf of the poor raises the most diffi-
cult questions about the role of the radical reformist. Once the line
between representation and activism fades or disappears, the radical re-
formist, as suggested earlier, endangers his own status. It becomes dif-
ficult for him to explain how he arrogated the representational role,
particularly in a democracy. Nevertheless, petitioning, electioneering,
and demonstrating all have their places in his developmental plans.
Whether he executes this aspect of his role best by contesting injunc-
tions against his clients' demonstrations or securing freedom for im-
prisoned group leaders, for example, or by advising violation of injunc-
tions or pursuing political tactics in the courts, is a controversy that not
even the self-proclaimed radicals have yet resolved.20
28. Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YAL, LEJ. 1049, 1053-58 (1970).
29. See Kinoy, supra note 23, at 17 (emphasis original):
Mo mold one's role as a lawyer or teacher of law in such a fashion as to
facilitate the resolution of contradictions in a positive direction . . . requires
initially the willingness to study in depth the particular characteristics of the
individual case or people's movement in which the radical lawyer is involved,
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II. A DESCRIPTON OF LEGAL AID MODELS
In Part I, our purpose was to gain some insight into the develop-
ment process, with particular emphasis on the place of the law and
lawyers. If, as suggested, legal service models reflect the different
stages of development and replicate the range of professional response
to these stages, surely planners would want to raise such theoretical
considerations to a conscious level when making choices among the
models of legal services. Implicit in such a suggestion is an assumption
that rational discourse can have an effect on policy formulation and im-
plementation and, more specifically in our context, can dictate the
choice of "the right" model or, with more certainty, the superiority of
one model over another. We make no such sweeping claim, however.
It is our belief that historical imperatives-existing social forces and
conditions, political institutions, personalities-far more than planning,
will determine in any particular country whether legal services for the
poor will be fostered and, if so, according to what model. For example,
the existence of the English legal tradition in a former colony would
be likely to lead to the adoption of the English legal assistance model
even if rational planning indicated the adoption of a different one.
To cast doubt on the significance of rationality, however, does not
deny the utility of the endeavor; it merely defines it more modestly.
Recognition of the limitations imposed by existing circumstances and
conditions simply diverts rational inquiry into pragmatic channels. In-
stead of producing a theoretically "best" model, the evaluative standard
we envision need only supply the basis for selecting the "best suited"
model. Presumably a service may be rendered by providing planners
with a scheme for perceiving how different models comport with their
perception of their country's developmental stage and plan.
Furthermore, by "best suited" we do not purport to say anything
about the national goals against which the standards should be meas-
ured. Reference to and reliance upon certain theories about the evolu-
tion of legal institutions and the adoption of certain descriptions of the
legal profession do not mean that we have any "first principles" that
enable us to determine what constitutes progress and the "right" choice
so as to discover in that precise situation the most effective way to facilitate
the interplay of both roles-the defense of the elementary forms of democratic
liberties there under attack and, utilizing the arena the enemy has chosen, the
development of a political counter-offensive which deepens the understanding
of masses of people and accelerates their already swirling motion.
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at each stage of development. Whatever opinions we hold apply to
our own country and, in any case, are reserved. Perhaps an example
can best make the point. Suppose that in a nation emerging from a
tribal culture a unitary criminal code is rigorously enforced as a delib-
erate means of promoting a national legal ethic. Policymakers might
conclude that if the state provided legal assistance to the accused, the
exemplary function of public criminal prosecutions would be diffused,
hopelessly confusing some segments of the population. In such a situa-
tion an assigned-counsel model might be chosen, even though theoreti-
cally a publicly supported legal service model would be preferable.
In sum, generalities must yield to particularities; a framework is a
generality, and it cannot presume to offer more than a frame of refer-
ence. In this spirit, the description of legal aid models that follows is
offered only as an inventory of possibilities. For purposes of inter-
model comparison, the description is broken into the elements of (a)
Funding and Policy, (b) Delivery Mechanism, and (c) Operations.
Frequent allusion is made to the theoretical backdrop sketched in Part
I, but no systematic reference is attempted. This is not an abandon-
ment of theory, but simply a recognition that no purpose is served by
repetitiveness.
A. Legal Aid Society
1. Funding and Policy
Organizations of the "Legal Aid Society" model are funded pre-
dominantly through private sources; to a great extent, it is these sources
that determine policy.30 One source of funds is the large, private char-
itible institution or social agency. Legal aid offices so funded are com-
ponent parts of the funding agencies. As such, they are funded only
to the extent of legal aid's priority in the agency's overall budget; the
priority usually is low. Furthermore, budgeting can be uncertain and
subject to change.
Other sources of funds are local bar associations and local govern-
ments. Local bar associations, though they often have a voice in pol-
icy, infrequently give financial support to legal aid organizations. Com-
30. NATIONAL LEGAL Am Am DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, ANNUAL REPORT (1963).
For a thorough history of legal aid, see E. BROwNELL, LEGAL AID IN Tim UNIE
STATEs (1951, Supp. 1961). For a more recent review, see Silverstein, Thoughts on the
Legal Aid Movement, 40 SOcLAL SmEv. REv. 135 (1966).
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bined funding has been the most successful, probably because a
diffusion of funding also diffuses policy-making power, and the proj-
ect's staff can exercise more control over direction than in the case of ex-
clusive funding. In addition, budgets are more secure with multiple
funding sources. The Legal Aid Society model is characterized by
combined funding.
In 1965 legal aid organizations in the United States received about
$5 million, channeled primarily through general charitable resource
clearing houses such as the United Fund and Community Chest. As
a consequence, there have been two basic effects on general policy:
an overriding charitable intent towards clients, and a reluctance to act
in local commercial litigation in which program efforts may be directed
against contributor-businessmen. 31
An important result of the large policy-making role of local bar
associations has been the imposition of rigid controls on client eligibility
and the subject matter of cases. Although this is not the only limiting
force, it appears to be a major influence in all programs. The reason
for the control appears to be the preservation of business for private
practitioners.32
When the tie with a charitable organization is strong, general policy
is usually made by the parent organization, with the result that the legal
aid program tends to degenerate into an in-house legal department for
the social agency. Consequently, potential clients are unaware that le-
gal representation is available on a wide variety of matters, including
those unrelated to the activities of the particular charity.
If no tie to a particular social agency is present, as in the case of
the classic Legal Aid Society, independence results in various benefits.
According to an early observer,
31. Carlin & Howard, supra note 10, at 417.
The refusal of most legal aid offices to represent indigents in divorce cases in all but
the most urgent situations reflects the charitable underpinning of these organizations.
Divorce, according to the usual policy rationale, is a privilege rather than a right; in
any case, public policy should discourage it. A similar refusal to handle bankruptcy
cases is probably a direct result of staff hesitancy to antagonize contributing business
interests. Some point out, however, that those businessmen who support charity do not
prey upon the poor, and that, in any event, the financial connection is too indirect to
play a serious role in litigation policies. See id. at 415; Note, Neighborhood Law Of-
fices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HAIv. L. REv. 805, 808-09
(1967).
32. See Comment, ,mpra note 18, at 334.
Vol. 1975:5]
Washington University Open Scholarship
20 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
This .[independence] has made for greater responsibility and freedom
of action in discovering their most useful roles in community service
S. .. This independence has been especially advantageous for Legal
Aid because the service could develop in close cooperation with the Bar
where its professional roots must lie and, simultaneously, evolve effec-
tive ties with the social welfare field within which it must operate. Be-
ing "on its own" gives it a better status in the family of community agen-
cies and yet assures its rating as a law office in the eyes of other lawyers.
It can stand up to narrow and short-sighted factions in the bar when
necessary and, with equal force, it can resist occasional pressures to sub-
ordinate its legal services to purely social welfare considerations.38
2. Delivery Mechanism
The delivery mechanism of legal aid programs has proved seriously
ineffective from the standpoint of accessibility to the poor as well as
the representation capability of the programs themselves.8 4
Although offices may be located in poor neighborhoods, many are
in downtown office buildings or courthouses, which are often remote
from client groups. A more serious accessibility problem is lack of
publicity. Many potential clients simply are not aware of the availabil-
ity of legal aid programs. Frequently, lack of publicity is the result
of lack of funds, as well as the desire to discourage the expansion of
already over-extended caseloads. Unsurprisingly, the help of legal aid
agencies usually is not sought by the poor until they are sued, and often
they do not seek help even then. These problems are compounded
by bar association rules limiting solicitation, although recent inroads
have limited interference with legitimate legal services activity/5
A potential client applying for legal aid faces strict screening. The
first and most important eligibility standard is the inability to pay a fee
to a private attorney; this scrupulously guarded control mechanism re-
sults in denials of about twenty percent of all applications for legal aid.8
Strict financial eligibility rules have resulted in criticism of the exten-
sive and sometimes degrading personal interviews that must be con-
33. E. BROWNELL, supra note 30, at 88.
34. The chief reason may be the traditionally inadequate funding given such pro-
grams. Where such programs exist they have satisfied only about ten percent of the
actual need for legal services.
35. Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Coun-
sel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972).
36. P. WALD, LAW AND PovERTY 49 (1965).
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ducted before an applicant can see a lawyer. This interviewing, it is
said, depersonalizes the lawyer-client relationship. A more serious
problem is that the lay personnel involved in screening applicants may
not be qualified to decide how serious a case is or how much merit
it may have. These problems are a reflection of planning failures and
the influence of professionalism with its accompanying insensitivity to
human needs.3 7
Elsewhere, by comparison, the merits and probability of success of
the applicant's case are proper factors in the eligibility decision.38 In
Germany full hearings are held to determine the plausibility of the ap-
plicant's case, and the applicant's adversary is even invited to contest
eligibility. A problem with this application process is that one often
needs a lawyer to get a lawyer.
The representational capability of legal aid offices is inadequate pri-
marily because there is an excessive demand for limited resources. As
a result of time pressures, most cases can be handled only perfunc-
torily. Cases that can be dealt with by a few calls or letters are well
served, but anything more complex is beyond the capability of many
offices. Fact investigation, legal research and drafting, and court ap-
pearances are victims of these pressures. It has been found that Legal
Aid offices in which six percent or more of cases involve court work
handle only half as many cases per attorney as offices in which less than
six percent of the cases involve court work.39
3. Operations
Funding, policy-making and design of the delivery system of Legal
Aid programs illustrate the traditional advocacy model. Representa-
tion is individual, and rarely are law reform cases prosecuted. No ef-
fort is made to give the poor anything more than adequate legal repre-
sentation.
37. See Capelletti & Gordley, supra note 12, at 387, 393. Gordley points out, cor-
rectly, that such program controls reflect traditional views about the right to legal aid-
a legalistic and individual view. Id. at 387-88, 392-94.
38. Klauser & Riegert, Legal Assistance in the Federal Republic of Germany, 20
Burr. L. REv. 583 (1971). The same criteria are used in Italy and France. See Capel-
letti & Gordley, supra note 12, at 364-73; Gori-Montanelli & Piergrossi, The Availabil-
ity of Legal Services to Poor People of Limited Means in Foreign Systems: Italy, 6
INT'L I.AW. 133, 137-38 (1972).
39. Carlin & Howard, supra note 10, at 417; see Gardiner, Defects in Present Legal
Aid Services and the Remedies, 22 TEN. L. REv. 505 (1952).
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B. Assigned Counsel
1. Funding and Policy
Assigned counsel systems are widely used in the United States for
the representation of indigent criminal defendants. They are estab-
lished and funded by the state.40  The widespread use of such pro-
grams reflects the American legal imperative that criminal defendants, re-
gardless of their ability to pay, must be represented by counsel,4 1 al-
though no analogous commitment has been made on behalf of poor civil
litigants.42 Compensation for services and reimbursement for expenses
range from nothing to amounts fixed by judicial discretion. On a local
basis, counties are responsible for managing their own programs; often
the funds committed are inadequate to pay the lawyers appointed. The
differences in compensation of assigned counsel are striking from one
locality to another. In all federal criminal proceedings, on the other
hand, the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 4 has made adequate and uni-
form provision for compensating lawyers appointed to represent de-
fendants charged with federal crimes. The program provides twenty
dollars per hour for out-of-court and thirty dollars per hour for in-court
work, with a ceiling of $2000, which can be waived in a lengthy trial.44
2. Delivery Mechanism
The major variable in the delivery system of this model is the
method of selecting lawyers. Of course, the selection method affects
the quality of representation and the time of appointment of counsel,
which, in turn, influence a defendant's chances of acquittal.
Commonly, the presiding judge appoints counsel from a list of
lawyers participating in the program. The list may contain the names of
lawyers who volunteered or were chosen to fulfill civic responsibility.
Frequently, local bar associations are responsible for preparing lists and
40. See 1 L. SILVERSTEN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN
STATE CouRTS 15-38 (1965); Summers, Defending the Poor: The Assigned Counsel
System in Milwaukee County, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 525.
41. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
42. See Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1270
(1966); Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Per-
sons in Civil Cases, 2 VALPARmiso U.L. REv. 21 (1967); Note, The Right to Counsel
in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1322 (1966); Note, Tile Indigent's Right to
Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1), (2), (3) (1970).
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keeping them current. There are a variety of other ways to select
counsel; it is not uncommon for judges simply to appoint any lawyer
waiting in the courtroom for just such work.46
It has been pointed out that this system lends itself to the procure-
ment of young, inexperienced lawyers in need of fees and experience,
often at the expense of indigent clients. This fact, coupled with the
widespread inadequacy of compensation and reimbursement, results in
the needless loss of many cases. Perhaps the most serious result is that
more guilty pleas are entered by defendants represented by assigned
counsel than by those with retained counsel.46
Usually counsel is assigned sometime after arrest and before trial.
By the time counsel is appointed, many factors leading ultimately to
conviction, such as confession, will have occurred. 47 Furthermore, un-
til recently it was thought that misdemeanor defendants had no right
to assigned counsel.4"
Eligibility controls are varied; in general, however, they are applied
less strictly than those in civil programs. This distinction is probably
the result of the view that incarceration is a matter more serious than
the consequences of civil disputes.
3. Operations
Law reform activity will rarely occur in assigned counsel programs
because the motivation is absent. Assigned advocates are fulfilling a
45. See Note, Judicial Problems in Administering Court Appointments of Counsel
for Indigents, 28 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 120 (1971). Among the experiences of one of
the authors, as teacher and student in a Boston clinical education program, was an after-
noon spent observing such judicial appointments from a large pool of lawyers who, we
were told, frequented the courtroom and whom the judge knew quite well. The court
was the Boston Municipal Court, and the judge was the famous Elijah Adlow. Both
institutions are retiring from the scene and with them, probably a form of law and jus-
tice that was always ad hoc, often visceral, and frequently nononstitutional, but-one
felt warmly-thoroughly fair more often than not.
46. ATroRNEY GENERAL'S CommrIE- REPORT: PovERTY AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION oF FEDR.AL CRiMiNAL JusTcE 29 (1963). 1 L. SLVER IN, supra note 40 at
21-25, points out that this may be as much for social reasons as a function of the law-
yer's level of interest in the case; that is, statistics show that indigents are more likely
to be guilty of crimes.
47. 1 L. SmvRsnsTN, DEFENSE OF THE PooR in CnvMwAL CAsEs IN AMnPiCAN
STATE CouTs-A PRELIMNARY SuRyWY 23 (1964).
48. It is now established that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony,
unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
37 (1972).
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civic duty, or, in many cases, gaining experience by trial representation.
The time and expense of appellate preparations are usually considered
dispensable, especially since many convictions of indigents are unlikely
to be reversed. Thus, the traditionalist fits into the assigned counsel
model.
C. Defender Systems
1. Funding and Policy
Funding of a private or public defender office is either private, pub-
lic, or some mix of the two, depending on the statute or court rule au-
thorizing it. The most distinctive difference, in this respect, from the as-
signed counsel model is the provision for a salary to a single individual
or group of individuals. Hence, lawyers employed full time as defend-
ers can exercise unfettered judgment in allocating their time and
energy based on the merits of the cases. This freedom is not available
to assigned counsel, who must justify their time on personal balance
sheets, often at the expense of possibly meritorious, but time-consum-
ing defenses.
,The independence of the defender, however, has been questioned
by those who note that he must always consider that periodic approval
of his budget must come from the same judge in whose court he tries
cases. Moreover, it is said, the defender cannot be fully indpendent
because the source of his salary is a governmental or political institu-
tion that may have a predisposition for one "side" of the criminal jus-
tice system. 49 A further general criticism is that some find unappeal-
ing a criminal justice system in which both the prosecutor and the de-
fender are paid from the same source-,-the state.50
Lastly, studies have shown that, as a general proposition, defender
systems are more economical to operate in thickly populated jurisdic-
tions and that assigned counsel systems are financially more appropriate
in sparsely populated jurisdictions, with the point of division being a
population of 400,000'.5
2. Delivery Mechanism
The delivery process in this model is largely self-executing. The
only administrative factor that varies from program to program is eligi-
49. 1 L. SiLvmtnmw, supra note 40; at 50-52.
50. Id. at 63-69. " ;. "
51. See generally 1 L. Smvmsm, supra note 40.
[Vol. 1975:5
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/8
AN EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK
bility standards; in this respect, assigned counsel and public defender
programs are similar.
3. Operations
The continuity of the defender model leads to several consequences
that distinguish its operation from that of the assigned counsel model.
Selection of defenders is a more formal process, and the position often
is subject to qualifications relating to education and experience.
Hence, the defender may be more qualified and experienced than the
typical appointed counsel, as well as more dedicated to his advocacy
role, having chosen to work at it for a period of time rather than on
an ad hoc basis.
This permanence also facilitates an ongoing, working relationship be-
tween prosecutor and defender that grows out of repeated encounters.
As they grow to trust each other's judgment, the number of cases that
can be "pleaded" without a trial increases, so that the defender can
handle more cases and thereby dispense "more justice" to indigent de-
fendants. Some critics point out that the closeness of the relationship
between the two impedes the independence of the defender. The only
clear point that can be made is that, since no checks are readily avail-
able on the conduct of the defender, his closeness to the prosecutor
could cut both ways, depending on the individuals concerned. The re-
sult of comparison studies of assigned and retained counsel and public
defenders must be tempered with the knowledge that there are 3,100
counties in the United States, each with a different system. 2
D. Neighborhood Law Office
1. Funding and Policy
The neighborhood law office (NLO) model was the chief innovation
of the Legal Services Program (LSP). The LSP was set up as an ad-
junct to the Community Action Agencies (CAA) mandated by the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.53 Under the plan, individual local
52. See, e.g., Gitelman, The Relative Performance of Appointed and Retained
Counsel in Arkansas Felony Cases-An Empirical Study, 24 ARm. L. REv. 442 (1971);
Note, Representation of Indigents in California-A Field Study of the Public Defender
and Assigned Counsel Systems, 13 ST~r. L. REv. 522 (1961).
53. Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 222(3), 81
Stat. 698.
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LSP's normally incorporated as nonprofit institutions, established cer-
tain authority links with local CAA's and bar associations, and received
eighty percent federal funding by annual contract with the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO).5" By 1971, the LSP had become an
independent agency within OEO and expended sixty million dollars in
265 projects.55
Since the federal share of funds was largely without strings and the
local share (twenty percent) was usually contributed by "in kind" ser-
vices, finances did not influence policy to any great extent. Politics,
however, played a large role.
According to Professor Earl Johnson, a former LSP director, the pro-
ponents of the new model combined the guiding view of the law re-
form school, which "sought formal changes in the legal structure pri-
marily through the medium of litigation," and the view of the Cahns,
who saw the lawyer as an advocate for the poverty community, aiding
it to achieve a redistribution of income, education, and opportunity."0
These views lie near the opposite end of the spectrum from the tradi-
tional advocacy model and, predictably, led to controversy.
Among the few specific statutory requirements for local programs
was a provision that local and state bar association be "consulted" prior
to the funding or refunding of projects. 57 Policy-making, as such, was
decentralized, and local governing boards had nearly total authority,
subject to a few limitations in the funding contract with the national
LSP. A 1967 amendment to the statute required that one-third of the
54. The Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (Supp. IV 1974), which
became effective in July 1974, transferred the Legal Services Program from the Office
of Economic Opportunity to a Legal Services Corporation. With a few exceptions, oper-
ation of the program at the local level is unaffected by the transfer. See text accom-
panying note 84 infra.
55. See OFicE Or ECONOMIC OpORTuNrry, ANNUAL REPORT (1971). See gener-
ally Caplan & Johnson, Neighborhood Lawyer Programs: An Experiment in Social
Change, 20 U. MLMI L. REV. 184 (1965); Green & Green, The Legal Profession and
the Process of Social Change: Legal Services in England and the United States, 21
HASTINGs LJ. 563 (1970); Pye & Garraty, The Involvement of the Bar in the War
Against Poverty, 41 NoTmn DAME LAw. 860 (1966).
56. See E. JOHNSON, JUSTcE AND REFoam: Tim FoRMATI YEARS or TE OEO
LEGAL. SERvicEs PRoon.Am 32-35 (1974), summarizing Calm & Calm, The War on Pov-
erty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(3) (1970). The other two requirements were that serv-
ices be of a high professional quality and that criminal representation not be undertaken.
Although the law allowed state governors to veto programs (subject to OEO-LSP over-
ride), that has occurred only once, and then without political motivation. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 2996f(a) (1), (8), (b)(1) (Supp. 1975). See also id. § 2996(2).
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membership of local CAA boards consist of members of the poverty
community. 5s The national LSP required local LSP boards to conform
to this ratio, and later required as well that sixty percent of each board
be lawyers.59 The latter effort was intended to increase the LSP's au-
tonomy and it followed the development of friction between the social
welfare role, as perceived by the community action agencies, and the
professional advocacy role, as perceived by legal service lawyers. 60 The
result of this requirement was that lawyers from local bars played a
large role in policy formulation; to the extent they were conservative,
policy was conservative. 61 Domination by either CAA personnel or lo-
cal bar association members, it has been argued, undercut any signifi-
cant role for the views of client groups and LSP staff members in policy
development. Resulting conflicts may have impeded the program in
the discharge of its functions; more important, however, general law
reform activities, such as class actions or community education, were
sometimes simply prohibited.62
2. Delivery Mechanism
Physical proximity to the client group was one of the chief goals of
the architects of the LSP. Nearly all the LSP's were located in poverty
neighborhoods, and many made special efforts to publicize their pres-
ence in the community.
Eligibility standards were set locally. The goal of the standards was
two-fold: to minimize the risk of taking paying clients away from the
private bar, and to ensure the most efficient application of LSP re-
sources to aid those most in need. Very few programs systematized
eligibility controls beyond those simple components. Some, however,
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2791(f) (2) (1970).
59. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2996f(c) (Supp. 1975).
60. See, e.g., Hannon, The Leadership Problem in the Legal Services Program, 4
LAw & Soc'y REv. 235 (1969); Hannon, Legal Services and the Community Action Pro-
gram: Oil and Water in the War on Poverty, 28 NLADA B1UFcAsE 5 (1969).
61. Cf. Hannon, Murphy Amendments and the Response of the Bar: An Accurate
Test of Political Strength, 28 NLADA BRIEFCASE 163 (1970); Hannon, National Policy
Versus Local Control: The Legal Services Dilemma, 5 CAL. W.L. REv. 223 (1969);
Johnson, Refutation and Endorsement: A Reaction to Hannon's Analysis of the Murphy
Amendment and the Bar, 28 NLADA BRIFcAsE 257 (1970). See also Shriver, Orga-
nized Bar and OEO Legal Services, 57 A.B.A.J. 223 (1971); Voorhees, The OEO Legal
Services Program: Should the Bar Support It?, 53 A.B.A.J. 23 (1967).
62. Note, The Legal Services Corporation: Curtailing Political Influence, 81 YALE
Li. 231, 238-45 (1971); see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2996e(d) (5), 2996f(b) (5) (Supp. 1975).
Vol. 1975:5]
Washington University Open Scholarship
28 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
examined possible future resources of clients, checked on the particular
fee usually charged for the service sought, and even provided an in-
ternal appeals procedure for applicants denied aid. 8
The OEO program had no provisions for relative eligibility, under
which a client could get partial services or full services for a partial fee.
In borderline cases in the early years of the program, judges and adver-
saries would sometimes make eligibility a substantive issue in the litiga-
tion in which they were involved.64 Moreover, eligibility controls were
used, on occasion, to deny representation to some civil rights plaintiffs,
anti-establishment types, and those who were "involuntarily poor," such
as young poverty workers. 65
3. Operations
Throughout the program's existence each local office had to find its
own balance between law reform activity and individual representation.
The resulting well-known debate need not be recounted in detail.00
Some lawyers favored broad law reform work, even at the direct ex-
pense of specific clients' interests, but usually at the more indirect ex-
pense of the diversion of resources from "service" functions. Others
favored the service function, or individual representation. For reasons
of both conscience and practicality, each side had legitimate grounds
for its stand, though it appears incontrovertible that the law reformers
purchased much greater amounts of justice per dollar than did the ser-
vice-oriented advocates. Of particular merit in the LSP model was the
flexibility that enabled both points of view to be tested against each
other, often in the same office. This flexibility probably stemmed from
63. Silverstein, Eligibility for Free Legal Services in Civil Cases, 44 J. URBAN L.
549 (1967); Note, supra note 31, at 846. But see 42 U.S.C.A. § 2996f(a)(2) (Supp.
1975).
64. See, e.g., Dimmick v. Watts, 490 P.2d 483 (Alas. 1971). See generally Stumpf
& Janowitz, Judges and the Poor: Bench Responses to Federally Financed Legal Services,
21 STAN. L. REv. 1058 (1969).
65. In one case, a desegregation suit, plaintiff was denied eligibility despite a local
program evaluator's finding in favor of it. Symposium, Legal Services for the Poor, 6
HOUSTON L. REv. 939, 1043-44 (1969).
66. Cf. Hazard, Law Reforming in the Anti-Poverty Effort, 37 U. Cm. L. Ruv. 242
(1969); Hazard, Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 699 (1969);
Note, Competition in Legal Services Under the War on Poverty, 19 STAN. L. R v. 579
(1967). See generally Finman, The Relationship Between Program Ideology and Pro-
gram Performance, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 1001.
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the decentralized policy-making structure. That such decentralization
did not result in any serious imbalance between the planners and the
professionals may be partly attributable to the quality that Professor
Franck has called the American's lawyer's successful reconciliation of
contradictory social demands. 67
It has been found that political influence impeded the operation of
the LSP. When a group at the local level felt that its interests were
in jeopardy as a result of a policy or a case being handled by the legal
services office, it would politicize the issue and attempt to generate con-
troversy. Such disputes arose with regard to local supervision, eligi-
bility controls, and the kinds of cases the programs should handle., s
E. Legal Services Corporations
1. Funding and Policy
The proposal to convert the Legal Services Program into a national
corporation had as its goal the elimination of much of the political con-
flict by providing for more carefully structured policy-making inputs.69
The proposal rejected by presidential veto in 1971 would have created
an autonomous national board of directors composed of four groups:
the bar, the community at large, the client group, and the legal services
staff lawyers. The national board was provided very few general policy
mandates or goals and left with a vast amount of discretion to decide
specific policy. In addition to the promulgation of eligibility standards,
the legislative mandate required the establishment of procedures that
67. [The American Lawyer] has become an expert at designing both profound
social transformation and pragmatic incremental initiatives, while maintaining
intact those guidelines of consistent, reciprocal, orderly social interaction essen-
tial to stability and mutual confidence....
Franck, supra note 3, at 793.
68. Suits against local business interests and the government have been the most
controversial. See Falk & Pollak, What's Wrong With Attacks on the Legal Services
Program, 58 A.B.A.J. 1287 (1972); Karabian, Legal Services for the Poor: Some Politi-
cal Observations, 6 U. SAN FRANcIsco L. Ray. 253 (1972); Robb, Controversial Cases
and the Legal Services Program, 56 A.B.AJ. 329 (1970); Note, supra note 31; Note,
supra note 62. For a discussion of ways to limit such interference, see Botein, The Con-
stitutionality of Restrictions on Poverty Law Firms: A New Case Study, 46 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 748 (1971).
69. Kantor, National Legal Services Corporation, 29 NLADA BRMFCASE 7 (1971);
Palmer, A National Legal Services Corporation: The Legal Profession's Responsibility,
46 CAL. ST. BJ. 447 (1971); Pearson, To Protect the Rights of the Poor: The Legal
Services Corporation Act of 1971, 19 KAN. L. REv. 641 (1971).
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would provide the poverty lawyer-client relationship the same insulation
from outside interference as enjoyed by private attorneys and their cli-
ents.70  One-half of the local boards were to be lawyers, one-third were
to be poor persons,
The version of the bill finally enacted as the Legal Services Corpora-
tion Act of 1974 states as one of its purposes that
attorneys providing legal assistance must have full freedom to protect
the best interests of their clients in keeping with the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Ethics, and the high standards of the pro-
fession.71
The makeup of the national board is altered to require only that a ma-
jority "be members of the bar of the highest court of the State. '72  Lo-
cal offices must be governed by boards upon which sixty percent of the
positions are filled by members of the state bar; one board member
must be an "individual eligible to receive legal assistance . . .,,M
Although insulation of the local offices from political pressures is
clearly a concern of the Act, more specific provisions are aimed at limit-
ing the political and "radical" activities of the Corporation and local of-
fices. Thus, corporation and local employees are prohibited from en-
couraging or participating in public demonstrations 74 and advocating or
opposing referendums. 75 Certain class actions are prohibited,71 as are
"political activity"77 and "frivolous appeals. 78  Corporation funds may
not be used to support various training programs, 79 desegregation
suits,80 or provide legal assistance in certain abortion proceedings81 or
to deserters or draft evaders.8 2 The national corporation is charged
with establishing eligibility criteria, including maximum income levels
and guidelines based on other regional and financial factors.83
70. S. 1305, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
71. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2996 (Supp. 1975).
72. Id. § 2996c(a).
73. Id. § 2996f(c).
74. Id. § 2996e(b)(5).
75. id. § 2996e(d)(4).
76. Id. § 2996e(d)(5).
77. Id. §§ 2996e(e)(1), 2996f(a)(6).
78. Id. § 2996f(a)(7).
79. Id. § 2996f(b)(5).
80. Id. § 2996f(b)(7).
81. Id. § 2996f(b)(8).
82. Id. § 2996f(b)(9).
83. Id. § 2996f(a)(2).
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2. Delivery Mechanism
The delivery mechanism of this model is nearly identical to the de-
livery features of the LSP.
3. Operations
Local operations will be similar to those under the LSP. Some
observers think that the structural revisions will insulate lawyers for the
poor from political pressures and influence, at least if careful attention
is given to seating the "right" groups on the national and local boards.84
A different reading of the proposals might be that Congress intended
that the entire LSP be immersed in the political process so that opera-
tions conflict would be minimized. The price, however, of reducing
conflict may be a reduction in effectiveness. Perhaps the best evidence
that a legal service program is doing its job is the acrimony exhibited
by its adversaries. Nevertheless, political interference can be a real
and paralyzing dilemma unless there is enough flexibility in the policy-
making process to accommodate meaningful compromises between the
professionals and the planners.
F. Pro Bono Programs
1. Funding and Policy
Programs pro bono publico, in which lawyers and law firms discharge
what they conceive to be their public service responsibility by working
at reduced or waived fees, are fully voluntary and require no extensive
funding other than that for administrative services. Large urban law
firms in the United States have recognized that the policy of permitting
associates to spend up to twenty percent of their time on public service
work may be a selling point to young recruits. This policy may prove,
however, to be more a function of the lawyer employment market than
a matter of commitment.
2. Delivery Mechanism
There are different ways to structure a firm's involvement in pov-
erty law. The released-time model is the most common. Under this
84. Note, supra note 62, at 275-86. The Note's author argues that policy-making
authority should be distributed according to the impact the program will have on a group
and that group's contribution to the program. Hence, the argument goes, client groups
and staff lawyers should have the most say in policy. Such a constituency analysis is
not likely to carry the day.
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plan associates spend a prearranged portion of their working time on
projects they choose independently. 5  Although many firms have of-
fered such programs, the participation level has been low; regular firm
work must still be done. Moreover, pro bono cases tend to be small
and service-centered and therefore unattractive to young associates
eager to engage in part-time law reform.
Some firms use a supervisor, who is usually a partner assigned to
seek interesting public service work. Larger cases can be handled by
such an approach because the efforts of several lawyers can be coordi-
nated on a single project. The nartner also lends status to the program
within the firm.
Some firms have even set up branch offices in poor neighborhoods-
store-front offices. A lawyer from a legal aid association often is hired
to run the office. Staffing is by associates who rotate into the office
for six to twelve months, or longer. To prevent being overcome by
small "service" cases, the branch office often operates only by referral
from other poverty law offices. The branch office can then select what
it considers to be the most important cases.
A more advanced design is one in which the firm actually incorpo-
rates public service and poverty representation into its normal operating
structure. A regular public service department will be established and
headed by a partner, or a public service committee may be established
to seek cases for incorporation into the firm's regular administrative
channels. The cases are viewed as involving areas of substantive law
and are given their own pigeonhole at the firm.
3. Operations
One of the major problems in pro bono operations is the possibility
of conflicts of interest. It is not uncommon that "financial interests"
adverse to poverty clients will also be clients of the large urban law
firm. Hence, many firms take special precautions to avoid the possibil-
ity of conflicts. When they are discovered, it is not uncommon for the
firm to seek a discharge from the poverty client.
85. See F. MARKs, K. LEswiNG, B. FoRTNsy, THE LAwYER, THE PUBLIc, AND PRto-
ESriONAL RESPONSmIB.mY 103-18 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MA.ESI; Note, Structur-
ing the Public Service Efforts of Private Law Firms, 84 Hv. L. REV. 410, 415-17
(1970).
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G. Broker Models
1. Funding and Policy
Several brokerage institutions have been established for the purpose
of meeting the legal needs of the poor by coordinating the pro bono
efforts of law firms. The Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law (LCCRUL), organized in 1964 to provide lawyers for civil rights
workers in the South, has been quite successful. The national and local
boards of directors are composed of members of the most prestigious
law firms in the nation and many former high government officials.
There are offices in thirteen cities.
Another similar effort is the Community Law Office (CLO) in New
York. Under this program in 1970, 230 volunteer lawyers from large
laws firms, coordinated by a small full-time professional staff, handled
over three thousand civil and criminal matters.8 6
2. Delivery Mechanism
A delivery mechanism is all that the broker model purports to be.
It is an effort to match problems in law reform with lawyers capable
of solving them. The main limitation of this model is that it requires
a sizable, well organized, urban bar. It is unlikely that this model
would be an effective approach to service or law reform in under-
developed countries because of the inherent limitation in the number
and size of the law firms. It should, however, be considered a valuable
integrative tool that can educate lawyers to the plight and needs of the
poor in developed countries.
3. Operations
The work of the LCCRUL is mainly directed toward law reform.
Lawyers volunteer to handle specific cases, and the firms, in most cases,
contribute money as well as services. Work is funneled through a firm
partner to willing associates and, in this way, contacts are set up for
the ongoing collection and disposition of caseloads. An American Bar
Foundation study has assessed the LCCRUL as being of great, but as
yet unrealized, potential, and, more important, it is seen as an excellent
86. Kass, An Experiment in Legal Services, 58 A.B.A.J. 585 (1972). See generally
Mmm 151-85.
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vehicle to help elevate the social consciousness of lawyers and law
fiMS.87
The CLO is devoted primarily to the procurement of service-type
representation for members of the poverty community. Blocks of time
are committed to the CLO annually by large urban law firms. The
firms promise to:
(a) maintain a specified level of participation in CLO; (b) treat CLO
matters handled by participating lawyers as regular firm matters; (c)
designate a CLO liaison partner to exercise general supervision over the
firm's CLO practice; (d) indicate those partners who, together with
CLO's professional staff, are responsible for supervising the lawyers' per-
formance in civil and criminal matters; (e) maintain complete files and
time records on all CLO matters; (f) adjust firm workloads to take CLO
assignments into account; and (g) in general, communicate to all part-
ners and associates the firm's recognition that representation of poor cli-
ents is as legitimate and normal a part of the practice of law as [non-
poverty] representation.88
H. Public Interest Law Firms
1. Funding and Policy
Public interest law firm models may be distinguished by their sources
of funding. The membership-supported model, such as the Environ-
mental Defense Fund, derives its operating revenue from dues-paying
members and charitable contributions. Foundation-supported pro-
grams are of similar structure except that their revenue source is limited
to a single organization whose resulting control over operating policy
is nearly total.8 9 Self-supporting public interest law firms are among
the most innovative proposals; 0 funding is achieved by whatever a
client organization can pay and by awards of attorneys' fees in large
lawsuits. It has even been suggested that contingency fees be allowed
in claims for punitive damages. Other proponents point out that there
87. AnRs 135.
88. Kass, supra note 86, at 587.
89. See MAnKs 151-85; Berlin, Roisman, & Kessler, Public Interest Law, 38 Gao.
WASH. L REv. 675 (1970); Note, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J 1069
(1970).
90. An example is Public Advocates, Inc., of San Francisco; it has succeeded in re-
ceiving some large fee awards.
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is more independence in this model than is available in other funding
modes.
2. Delivery Mechanism
Public interest law firms, in nearly all cases, are engaged in broad-
scale law reform activities rather than individual client services. But
without an effective case intake mechanism, this model is in constant
danger of losing contact with the needs of the poor and thereby losing
its delivery mechanism and broad impact.
3. Operations
The membership and foundation-supported models are normally
nonprofit corporations staffed by full-time professionals. The member-
ship-supported firm does not provide individual legal services to its
members, although some members may be plaintiffs in law reform
suits. Although these plaintiffs have full legal standing in most cases,
it is important to note that they are not necessarily indigents, but are
parties interested in a public issue.91
In the United States, foundation-supported firms cannot engage in
legislative advocacy because of the adverse tax consequences to the
parent foundation. 2 A more serious, conceptual problem exists for the
self-supporting models: Should lawyers choose their clients and cases
according to the former's values? Should lawyers be permitted to op-
erate in a client vacuum, with their own policies as the only determi-
nants of the arguments made and relief sought in court? Or should
these policy determinants be supported by an "outside" constituency,
a client? Accountability has been considered one of the most impor-
tant questions requiring examination as the size and number of public
interest firms increase. 3
91. Observe the different operation of service-oriented membership firms, such as
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. See Note, Membership Supported Law Firms: A
Resolution of the Public Interest Law Dilemma, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1451 (1972). The
NAACP was plaintiff in a landmark Supreme Court case, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963), which helped articulate the right of such programs to exist in the face of
attacks from bar groups.
92. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 501(c) (3) allows business deductions for expenses
of corporate lobbyists, but denies tax-exempt status to charitable or public-service efforts
to influence legislation.
93. See mms 224-38; Ferren, Preliminary Thoughts about Public Decision-Making
and Legal Aid: The Prospects for Legitimacy, 1 CONN. L. REv. 263 (1968); Note,
jupra note 89, at 1128-37.
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I. Prepaid Legal Services
1. Funding and Policy
Financing is the core idea in the prepaid legal services model. Under
such a program persons associated in a group periodically contribute
a fixed, relatively small fee. In return, those who encounter legal diffi-
culties are represented by staff lawyers for no additional charge. In
short, the cost of legal services is spread among many people. Since
there are charges that must be paid to maintain coverage, this model
is designed primarily for moderate-income people rather than the hard-
core poor.
94
The prepaid legal service model, or prepaid legal cost insurance as
it is sometimes titled, closely parallels prepaid medical care delivery
systems; consequently, actuarial work and cost analysis are important
to the success of the program. Calculations begin with a given level
of contributions and the number of covered individuals; the resulting
figures are matched with the level and type of benefits that could eco-
nomically be provided to the members. Conversely, a desired list of
benefits could be subjected to a cost analysis to determine a minimum
per capita annual payment figure. Flexibility can then be put into the
scheme by the selective use of ceilings, policy limitations, and deducti-
bility features. Fairly reliable data about the kind of cases and fre-
quency of the use of lawyers must be available in order to make cal-
culations.
2. Delivery Mechanism
Accessibility is a feature nearly as important as financing. Since the
legal representation has been arranged in advance there will be no
problem obtaining a lawyer for the client. Who that lawyer may be
differs with the type of plan.
Under the "closed panel" plan the selection of a lawyer is restricted
to a limited list or a limited territory. Closed panel plans have existed
for some time and usually, but not always, restrict the scope of available
legal services to problems arising out of a certain activity, such as civil
rights (for example, the NAACP) or automobile driving (for example,
the AAA).
94. Ashe, Group Legal Services-Equal Justice in Fact: A Prognosis for the Seven-
ties, 23 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1167 (1972); Steiner, Bargained-for Group Legal Services:
Aid for the Average Wage Earner?, 11 Am. L. REv. 617 (1969); Stolz, Insurance for
Legal Services: A Preliminary Study of Feasibility, 35 U. Cm. L. Rpv. 417 (1968).
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An "open panel" plan allows participants to seek representation from
a wide geographic area and usually for a wider range of legal problems.
The open panel plan was first initiated in 1971 in Shreveport, Louisi-
ana.
95
3. Operations
Legal representation benefits are distributed in two basic ways: by
type of problem and specific type of assistance required. Types of bene-
fits can range from a narrow category, such as employment-related mat-
ters, to an almost unlimited range of personal legal problems. Specific
matters usually excluded from coverage are cases generated by a business
venture of a member or involving a contingency fee, controversies
where both parties are subscribers to the plan or are in an employer-
employee relationship, situations in which another insurance policy or
program provides for legal representation, title work, and the comple-
tion of tax forms.
Specific types of benefits are divided into advice and consultation,
office work, such as conferences and negotiation, and major legal ex-
pense benefits. Each type of benefit is assigned a dollar limitation,
and some have deductibility limitations.
In operation this model is strictly directed toward client service,
hence it is a traditional advocacy model. The introduction of its in-
novative funding arrangement has caused some turbulence, however,
because of the existing professional regulations against the lay practice
of law, solicitation, and encouraging litigation. These problems are
well on their way to being remedied.9
J. Judicare-American Model
1. Funding and Policy
A judicare program has existed on an experimental basis in a large
rural area in Wisconsin since 1966.97  The program is totally subsi-
95. Roberts, Shreveport Plan for Prepaid Legal Services-A Unique Experiment, 32
LA. L. REv. 45 (1971); see AMEmcAN BAR ASSOCATIoN, HANDBOOK ON PREPAJi LEGAL
SERvicES (1972).
96. See Christensen, Regulating Group Legal Services: Who Is Being Protected-
Against What--and Why?, 11 AIz. L. REV. 229 (1969); Zimroth, Group Legal Services
and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.. 966 (1967); Note, Group Legal Services, 79 HAv.
L Rnv. 416 (1965).
97. Preloznik, Wisconsin Judicare: An Experiment in Legal Services, 57 A.B.A.I.
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dized by the state government. Under the program, pre-enrolled cli-
ents obtain their own lawyers from an available panel, and the lawyers
are reimbursed directly from the judicare office. Fees are set at about
fifteen dollars per hour, and no lawyer can receive more than a ceiling
amount in any one year. In addition to fees, lawyers may be reim-
bursed for costs and expenses not specifically covered by the statute
or applicable court rules. Policy decisions are made by a governing
board consisting of lawyers and laymen.
One of the main problems of the program has been its cost. Accord-
ing to some, the average cost per case of the judicare model has been
three times the cost per case of a similar neighborhood law office.9"
Furthermore, it is argued that the moderately poor receive better serv-
ices than the hardcore poor because the cultural and geographical dis-
tribution of lawyers participating in the program favors the wealthier
areas.
2. Delivery Mechanism
Prospective clients apply for a judicare card from a local community
action representative or welfare director. Eligibility is based on the
same means test used in the legal aid model.99 Once a client has a
card, he can obtain a lawyer of his choice for most services, except for
matters involving criminal representation, income taxes, patent and
copyright problems, and contingent fee cases.
Judicare representation is probably not as accessible to potential cli-
ents as neighborhood law office representation. Moreover, since the
program employs no full-time staff attorneys, other than those em-
ployed primarily in administration, a base from which to conduct law
reform activities is absent. Hence, this model is primarily a service
model.
3. Operations
Proponents assert that the use of the private bar leads to a more thor-
ough coverage of dispersed rural poverty communities and that the tra-
ditional attorney-client relationship is better preserved. In addition, in-
1179 (1971); Schlossberg & Weinberg, The Role of ludicare in the American Legal Sys-
tem, 54 A.B.A.J. 1000 (1968).
98. Goodman & Feuillan, The Trouble With ludicare, 58 A.B.A.J. 477 (1972). But
see Brakel, The Trouble With ludicare Evaluations, 58 A.B.AJ. 704 (1972).
99. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
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digents can, in theory, no longer argue that their lawyers are not of the
caliber of those of their adversaries.
The greatest strength of a judicare program is the facility with which
legal services may be provided in rural areas. No other program, ex-
cept perhaps the prepaid, open-panel plan, can achieve the same de-
gree of decentralization and still continue to be effective. Cost levels,
however, have cast doubt on the prognosis for this model.
In relation to the element of voluntariness in the lawyers' participa-
tion, it has been pointed out that
[j]udicare is essentially an uncontrollable system-or nonsystem.
because the supply of services is dependent on the separate, autonomous
and unpredictable decisions of hundreds of scattered private lawyers as
to whether they will handle given numbers and types of clients and
cases. Some lawyers will foster a feeling in the poor community that
they will handle as many indigent clients as may care to come, while
others will discourage them altogether. Without an enforceable quota
system, the potential for uneven distribution of services would persist,
in contravention of the principle that the benefits of federally funded
programs should be equally available to all eligible persons.10°
K. Judicare-English Model
1. Funding and Policy
Judicare was introduced in England by the Legal Aid and Advice
Act of 1949.101 The scheme is administered by the Law Society, which
directly reimburses the many participating lawyers at rates somewhat
below standard fee levels. Funding is by government subsidy.
The program's policy still has traces of its charitable underpinnings;
suits concerning defamation or breach of promise to marry are not
taken. One of the reasons for the success of this judicare program is
said to be the discipline and cohesiveness of the English legal profes-
100. Goodman & Feuillan, supra note 98, at 481. For comparison of judicare and
legal services, see Marsh, Neighborhood Law Offices or Judicare?, 25 NLADA Bu-
CASE 12 (1966); Note, Judicare as an Alternative to Legal Aid in Albuquerque, 1 N.
Mrx. L. REv. 595 (1971).
101. 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51; see B. ABEL-SmrrH & R. STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE
CoURTs: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 17.50-1965, 315-48
(1967); Boskey, Availability of Legal Services to Poor People and People of Limited
Means in Foreign Systems: England and Wales, 6 INt'L LAw. 128-32 (1972); Cappel-
letti & Gordley, supra note 12, at 374-76; Pelletier, English Legal Aid: The Successful
E xperiment in Judicare, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 10 (1967); Utton, The British Legal Aid
System, 76 YALE L.J. 371 (1966).
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sions, a factor that should be considered by any nation attempting to
import the model.
2. Delivery Mechanism
Eligibility is determined primarily by a means test administered by
the Ministry of Social Security. In addition, the statute prescribes that
aid be given only when it is "reasonable" to do so; hence the scheme
is a modified version of continental systems that examine the merits
of applicants' cases.
Depending on his income and wealth, a client can receive full or par-
tial government payment for legal services, although the wealth limits
have been criticized as being unrealistically low ($600 to $1600 annual
income; $300 to $1200 capital assets). Decisions on eligibility are
made by a certifying committee operating without benefit of appear-
ances by the applicant or his adversary. Since the legal factors impel-
ling the applicant to seek assistance must set forth, along with finan-
cial data, a lawyer would appear to be needed before aid is granted;
this possibility does not, however, seem to have caused too much diffi-
culty.
An independent provision in the scheme permits up to one and a
half hours of oral advice to persons of a certain income category. This
provision supplements another Law Society plan under which any per-
son, regardless of his income, can have up to half an hour of consulta-
tion with a participating lawyer for $2.40. A recent proposal by the
Law Society would provide up to sixty dollars of legal services for any-
one asking for it.102
3. Operations
About one half of the civil cases litigated in England are subsidized,
in part, by the legal aid scheme. 0 3 A principal limitation of the system
is the preclusion of legal aid jurisdiction before special tribunals that
govern many areas of English law. Perhaps a greater limitation lies
in the fact that Britain has developed no vehicle for dispensing with
court costs assessed against indigents. In spite of these limitations, the
English scheme has brought the poor a long way along the road to jus-
tice.
102. Note, The Law Society's £ 25 Scheme, 119 NFw LJ. 752 (1969).
103. Dworkin, The Progress and Future of Legal Aid in Civil Litigation, 28 MoD.
L. REv. 432 (1965).
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HI. SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE CHOICE OF MODELS
Those who advocate legal aid development on a substantial scale in
nations in which poverty is widespread inevitably must justify their posi-
tion by discovering some possibility that legal assistance can profoundly
affect the distribution of wealth and social and political power. To gain
a better appreciation of whether such a potential exists in any particular
country for any particular legal service model requires study, research,
and experimentation of a kind and depth that has yet to be under-
taken.'04 In this light, only a few general observations can be offered
about the relevance of what has been said to the selection of models.
The first observation is that the degree to which lawyers' attitudes
and viewpoints influence the choice of model depends upon who de-
signs and promotes the legal service program. Obviously, if the design
is left to lawyers, their predispositions will count for much more than
if a legal service scheme is adopted by government planners in further-
ance of specific governmental policy. Even in the latter case, however,
the attitudes of lawyers may substantially influence the choice of the
model and its implementation. This will be so because the planners
themselves will probably be lawyers or persons who tend to rely on law-
yer's advice and lore. Even if the influence of lawyers' attitudes does
104. At a workshop that was held in the summer of 1974, a group of legal services
administrators and scholars from numerous Asian countries showed a decided preference
to deal with model selection in practical, as opposed to theoretical, terms. Among a
list of criteria they considered relevant, only the last coincided with the discussion in
this Article. The list was as follows:
(a) Acceptability of the Model. What existing groups and forces will resist
the particular model? Who will oppose and who will support each model?
(b) Costs and Financing. What resources are available to each model? Is
public funding of one model more likely than the next and why? Are certain
models inherently more expensive?
(c) Personnel. Is more competence and imagination likely to be attracted to
and generated by one model or the other? What about the frustrations and
difficulties of working conditions in one or the other?
(d) Quality of Service. Will evaluation of performance and quality controls
be more effective under one model or the other? Will training be better or
easier under one model or the other?
(e) Efficiency. Will there be greater opportunities for adopting techniques of
management and administration that are likely to increase the effectiveness and
scope of the service, in one model rather than the other?
Cf) Penetration. Is one model more likely to yield more profound legal and
social changes favorable to the poor than are others? Will one model or the
other better enhance the legal competence or political assertiveness of the
poor?
(Materials pertaining to the Asian Workshop on Legal Services to the Poor are on file
at Boston College Law School and at the International Legal Center in New York.)Washington University Open Scholarship
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not intrude at this stage, lawyers' influence cannot be wholly avoided
insofar as attorneys are necessary to the plan's implementation. What
this means to planners in developing nations is that in any legal aid pro-
gram, the "legal profession factor" must be carefully considered and
incorporated or perhaps discounted. The second observation then is
that any model choice that depends heavily on the private bar, or its
associational organs, must recognize that the attitudes of the tradition-
alist lawyer will predominate. Therefore, goals that are more ambi-
tious than those of the traditionalist may be thwarted. The judicare
and the legal aid society models are, in this regard, prime examples
of models that tend to place professional values in the forefront. This
tendency is most prevalent in models that also impose the burden of
financing the plan on the profession. He who pays the piper ....
There are two general ways of mitigating the impact of the traditional
lawyer. One is to choose a model that empowers the planners, or those
to whom they delegate such power, to supervise closely the activities
of the participating lawyers. This method probably entails, to some de-
gree, the second method of achieving the purpose of mitigating the pro-
fessional's influence: employ lawyers who share the goals of the pro-
gram. Both methods require a measure of governmental control,
which, in its more efficient forms, means a governmental agency or
service. The best American example of this model choice would be
a defender system.
Of course, this approach may minimize the influence of the profes-
sion as such, but it serves whatever goal the planners happen to be pur-
suing, including specific traditionalist goals. In fact, it is unlikely that
any directly and closely controlled governmental legal aid program will
pursue anything but conservative goals. The reason for this, our third
observation, is that a government devoted to basic social and economic
reforms will probably choose means more direct than legal aid pro-
grams for accomplishing its goals.1°5
Our last observation concerns the perplexing "free-floating" or "hy-
105. This may account for the general disinterest in legal aid programs shown by so-
cialist-leaning governments. We would not hazard a guess whether this disinclination
to establish a legal services program is a mistake or not, but it could be argued that
a legal services program committed to government reform policies could fulfill two use-
ful purposes. First, such a program could prevent entrenched interests from falling back
on the law to defend their position, while at the same time it would help preserve respect
for the rule of law. Secondly, it could educate the poor in the exercise of their newly-
created rights.
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brid" models. These models represent legal aid programs that are
funded by government, but which are, in varying degrees, free to pur-
sue goals fashioned by the staff lawyers and the interest groups they
happen to represent. Although traditionalist lawyers with strong social
consciences are attracted to such programs, the overwhelming appeal
of hybrid models is to the reformist lawyer who finds few other "legiti-
mate" outlets for his drives. It is the natural tendency of hybrid mod-
els, therefore, to be "captured" by the reformists, which, inevitably sets
off the dynamics of reaction.106
The perplexing nature of hybrid models, however, stems neither
from the fact that they are likely to be "captured" by reformists rather
than traditionalists, nor from the concomitant inhibitive effect of the po-
tential reaction, which, paradoxically, forces the reformists toward tra-
ditional behavior patterns. What is perplexing is that those programs,
exemplified by the OEO neighborhood legal service or the emerging
group plans, which hold the greatest promise for reform through legal
action, are likely to prove least attractive to reform-minded planners
for the very reason that such programs defy planning10 7 and tend to
"escape their creators." Legal service programs that may produce
challenges to governmental policies and actions are not likely to hold
much attraction for developing nations bent upon pursuing the three-
stage goals all at once.' Nevertheless, it is possible that with detailed
planning, such as limits on the kind of cases accepted or restraints on
initiating certain actions without prior planning agency approval, the
"hybrid" models in less "free-floating" forms could be made to serve
the needs of the developing nations best of all.
Finally, it should be re-emphasized that the framework constructed
in this Article is intended merely as an instrument into which the varied
conditions that exist in each society must be set. The conditions, in
the final analysis, must determine the model choice in each country.
106. For a flavor of the schism that has developed between officialdom and legal
service program lawyers in the United States, see Agnew, What's Wrong with the Legal
Services Program, 58 A.B.AJ. 930 (1972); Klaus, Legal Services Program: Reply to
Vice-President Agnew, 58 A.B.AJ. 1178 (1972).
107. "Free floating" plans may be the "socio-legal" analogue to the rise of inde-
pendent power sources during stage one in the "eco-legal" sphere. If that is the case,
they may be a phenomenon unique to the transition period from stage two to stage three.
108. See text accompanying note 8 supra. But see B. Metzger, Legal Services to the
Poor and National Development Objectives, in LEGAL Am AND WoRLD PovERTY-A
SURVEY OF ASIA, AFmCA, AND LATiN AMERICA 3-18 (1974).
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